In Plato's Meno, Socrates takes on an enlightened discussion with Meno about virtue. After claiming to know what virtue is but failing to adequately define it to Socrates, Meno realizes that he doesn't really know but goes on to conclude that since Socrates doesn't know either, it is not possible for them to learn the true meaning of virtue. This critical argument is known as Meno's paradox and is the subject of discussion in this paper. The purpose of this essay will be to carefully state and explain each part of Meno's paradox and then to evaluate the argument as a whole in terms of validity and as to whether or not it is sound.

The first premise of Meno's paradox is that if you know something then you cannot learn it. In this, Meno literally means that if a person already has a foreknowledge of something than one is unable to relearn it. This can be implied from the dialogue, meaning that if Meno had already known about knowledge and was therefore able to define it properly then this would put an end to quite a bit of this Socratic dialogue. An example of this premise may be taken in considering shape. If one already knows that a shape is, as Socrates defines it, "the limit of a solid" (76a), and, this proves to be an adequate definition, then it becomes impossible for one to relearn what one already knows.

The second premise of Meno's paradox is that if you don't know something than you can't learn it. The meaning behind this premise is somewhat more difficult to appreciate, but, as we shall see, highly significant. The reasoning behind this premise is that if you don't already have a foreknowledge of something than you won't be able to recognize it so as to acquire the knowledge of it. While on the surface this may seem superficial, consider if you will Meno's attempts to define virtue. Each time Meno offers an explanation of the term to which he claims to have given numerous speeches about, Socrates rejects them on some basis of inadequacy. This leads Meno to acknowledge his ignorance (80b) but poses a far greater dilemma for both Meno and Socrates (who also claims to be ignorant of the definition of virtue) when Meno asks:

How will you look for it[virtue], Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will know that this is the thing you did not know?(80d)

These become formidable questions when ones considers that there appears to be no absolute definition that either Meno or Socrates can agree on. Returning to the previous example of shape, one can see that without a foreknowledge of what a shape is, one is left to give inadequate definitions, what's more, should one happen to guess what the absolute definition of a shape actually is, they will have no way of identifying it as a proper and suitable definition.

The third premise of Meno's paradox is that you either know something or you don't. The reasoning behind this premise becomes apparent in light of the two previous premises stated. It should be noted here that the implications of this premise are significant in that they leave no middle ground when the natural conclusion of this argument is drawn later on. From the dialogue, Meno is convinced that since none of his definitions are adequate and they have no way of guessing correctly what the definition of virtue is, then the knowledge of such can never exist in a person's mind or else it would be consciously realized. In thinking about shapes once again, the true essence of "shapeness" is either already known or else can only be guessed at and never really determined.

The conclusion that is drawn from Meno's paradox is that learning is impossible. This implies a sense of hopelessness in acquiring knowledge for oneself. In the dialogue, this is the dilemma Meno poses to Socrates. Since he realizes that he obviously doesn't really know what virtue is (based on the fact that he couldn't adequately define it) he concludes that there is no possible or plausible way for him to acquire it. In terms of shapes, it follows that it is no longer conceivable to be able to procure an intimate understanding of the basis of knowledge to satisfactorily define "shapeness", and, then be capable of using this in distinguishing individual shapes.

At this point, we must analyze Meno's paradox in its entirety in order to evaluate it as a critical argument. Since an argument must first be valid in order to determine later on if it will be sound, let us turn our attention to this particular aspect first. A valid argument is defined to be one in which, based on the assumptions that the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. In other words, the end statement must be the logical result of consistent and sequential statements mentioned beforehand. As this applies to Meno's paradox, premise number three is the logical result of premises one and two. From there, the conclusion reached falls in line with being a true assumption based on all three premises. Therefore, it can be reasoned that Meno's paradox is in fact a valid argument and worthy of further scrutiny.

The next point we must address is to determine whether Meno's paradox is sound. The definition of a sound argument is one which conforms to the rules of validity and can be shown to possess truthful premises. It is simply not enough for an argument to be logical, its founding premises must be genuine and sincere. Here is where Meno's paradox starts to become suspicious. As mentioned earlier in this essay, premise number three presents us with an either/or situation where you either know something or you don't. However, this in no way takes into account knowledge of particulars (those specific objects which are located in time and/ or space and are sortable). With particulars such an extentional list of virtues or examples of shapes one has acquired at least a partial knowledge of the subject matter that clearly lies somewhere between knowing something and not knowing it. It is therefore false to conclude that learning is impossible since one can continually acquire a partial knowledge of things, thus, making this an unsound argument. The only way for Meno's paradox to escape this pretense is to employ the Principle of Charity (that of giving more openness and/ or leniency to the translation) to the argument. If one interprets the "something" you can or can't learn to be universals than the argument becomes sound again. Since a universal is defined to be the common essence of a group of particulars, there is no way for one to only partially grasp there meaning. To do so would result in both inadequate understanding and application, as was the case early on in the dialogue.

The second pretense that could render Meno's paradox unsound is the view of conceptualism, that is, that universals are not real, but, instead are mind dependent. In keeping with the mind set that Meno's paradox applies only to universals, premise number two becomes false. The ability to learn something you don't know is negated by the fact that there is no longer a correct way to learn it, so that you'll be able to recognize it. Learning becomes completely subjective and is left to the individual to acquire knowledge in their own fashion regardless of any foreknowledge. To this condition, we must once again reevaluate our interpretation of Meno's paradox to be one that implies seeing it from a Realist point of view, that is, one that believes that universals, are real, objective, and mind independent. This indeed is the view of Socrates, and, is in fact the only way for him to refute Meno's entire argument later on in the dialogue.

In my opinion, learning is indeed possible. We live in a society in which we are constantly being educated by either teachers, literature, computers, and/ or the media. The knowledge of particulars we acquire through life experiences will ultimately allow us to grasp what the meaning of the universals behind these things are. The real Meno's paradox for us today is whether we can retain all this information. Often times we are bombarded with so much information that we can only process about half of it at any one time, and then retain only a fraction of it later on. There indeed lies the real dilemma for us to solve if we are ever to refute our own mental shortcomings.

In conclusion, Meno's paradox can be explained as an argument that leads us to conclude that you either know something or you don't, and virtue (or any other universal) is therefore not possible to learn. This argument can be shown to be unsound in the face of partial knowledge of particulars, or, on the idea that conceptualism is true. However by adapting a Realist view based on universals, as Socrates does, one can fully appreciate the argument to be both the valid and sound. However, even on this bases' Meno's paradox can and is refuted later on in the dialogue by redefining the meaning of learning, and thus, exempting it wholly from the argument presented.